Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Steven and Suzanne West v. Inter-Financial Inc.,
Badi Mahmood : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Eckerseley; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Kevin A. Howard; David B. Hansen; Howard, Philips & Andersen; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, West v. Inter-Financial Inc, No. 20050195 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5629

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STEVEN AND SUZANNE WEST,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiffs, Appellants
Case No.: 20050195-CA

v.
INTER-FINANCIAL, INC.,
BADI MAHMOOD
Defendants, Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE THRDJ DISTRICT COURT

DAVID EXKERSLEY
PRINCE, YEATES
& GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
175 East 400 South, Suite #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 524-1000

KEVIN A. HOWARD (4343)
DAVID B. HANSEN (8197)
HOWARD, PHILIPS & ANDERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 366-7471
dbh@hpalaw.com

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

AUG 2 9 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STEVEN AND SUZANNE WEST,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiffs, Appellants
Case No.: 20050195-CA

v.
INTER-FINANCIAL, INC.,
BADI MAHMOOD
Defendants, Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE THRD3 DISTRICT COURT

DAVID EXKERSLEY
PRINCE, YEATES
& GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
175 East 400 South, Suite #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)524-1000

KEVIN A. HOWARD (4343)
DAVID B. HANSEN (8197)
HOWARD, PfflLD?S & ANDERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 366-7471
dbh@hpalaw.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

.".

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE /FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT I

6

ARGUMENT II

8

ARGUMENT III

14

CONCLUSION

16

I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Eaton Metal Products Co.,
272 F. Supp.2d 482 (E.D. PA 2003)

8

Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debrv. 38 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 2001)

15

Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utahl983)
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980)

9
.

9

Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90 (1984)

8, 9

Fennell v. Green, 77 P.3d 339 (Utah App.2003)

6, 7

Grynberg v. Agric. Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000)
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2000)

7
1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 16

Larsen v. United Federal Savings and Loan of Pes Moines,
300 N.W. 2d 281 (Iowa 1981)

13, 14

Schaaf v. Highfield, 896 P.2d 665 (Wash. 1995)

11, 12

SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 28 P.3d 669 (Utah 2001)

8

Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of California,
196 F.R.D. 653 (D. Utah 2000)

8

Stotlar v. Hester, 582 P.2d 403 (N.M. 1978)

12, 13

Town of Alma v. Azco Construction, Inc., 10 P.3d at 1256 (Colo. 2000)

8

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-27

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)

1

ii

OTHER
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, §7.6 at 546 (1956))

in

9, 10

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(4). This appeal results from a decision dated January 27, 2005, by the Honorable
Glenn K. Iwasaki, Third Judicial District Court, which granted Appellees' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Trial Court err in concluding that, under the economic loss doctrine,
a nonparty to a contract has no cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation under any circumstances, absent physical injury or
property damage?

2.

Does an appraiser have an independent duty of care to persons other than
those with whom the appraiser is in privity of contract?

3.

To what extent does an assignee have rights to sue for breach of contract?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Memorandum Decision granting Appellees' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness. Judgment is appropriate
only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-27.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
1.

On December 26, 1996, an appraisal of 2071 East Worchester Drive, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84121, was completed at the request of Dave Szumigala
and Ellen Daley ("the Sellers"), who owned and intended to sell the
property. The appraisal was performed by Inter-Financial, and signed by
Andrew Schofield as Appraiser (State Certification #CG00037502) and by
Badi Mahmood as Supervisory Appraiser. (R. at 641).

2.

On February 23, 1997, the Sellers sent a fax to the Appellees stating, "I
hereby authorize Drew Schofield (and his firm) [Inter-Financial] to transfer
the appraisal on 2071 East Worchester to Steve and Suzie West, Buyers of
the subject property." (R. at 642).

3.

The Appellees admit that they performed the appraisal. (R. at 17).

4.

On February 28, 1997, the Wests closed on the purchase of the home at
2071 East Worchester Drive, and closing documents prepared by Great
American Mortgage indicated a charge of $150.00 for the appraisal. (R. at
429).

5.

The appraisal contained an "Appraiser's Certification" section which
asserts,
7.

I performed this appraisal in conformity with the
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice
that were adopted and promulgated by the Appraisal
2

Standards Board of The Appraisal Foundation and that
were in place as of the effective date of this appraisal
(R. at 642).

The appraisal also contained a "Supervisory Appraiser's Certification"
section which stated,
If a supervisory appraiser signed the appraisal report, he or
she certifies and agrees that: I directly supervise the appraiser
who prepared the appraisal report, have reviewed the
appraisal report, agree with the statements and conclusions of
the appraiser, agree to be bound by the appraiser's
certifications numbered 4 through 7 above, and am taking full
responsibility for the appraisal and the appraisal report. (R. at
642).
The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Standards Rule
1-1 indicates that in developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must:
1.

Be aware of, understand, and correctly employ those
recognized methods and techniques that are necessary to
produce a credible appraisal;

2.

Not commit a substantial error of omission or commission
that significantly affects an appraisal;

3.

Not render appraisal services in a careless or negligent
manner, such as a series of errors that, considered
individually, may not significantly affect the results of an
appraisal, but which, when considered in the aggregate, would
be misleading.

(emphasis added). (R. at 5).
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8.

The Appellees admitted to a contractual and a professional duty to act in
accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice
in performing the appraisal. (R. at 18).

9.

On or about November 23, 1997, the West's reviewed the appraisal and
discovered many errors on the appraisal report including among others:
A.

Incorrect Square Footage Calculation On The Home - The square
footage on the home in The Defendants's appraisal report was
significantly higher than the actual square footage. The appraisal
indicated a total of 2,558 finished square feet and 1,122 unfinished
square feet. When the West's re-measured the square footage in
November 1997, they found that the house contained 2,168 finish
square feet. And 952 un-finished square feet. The Salt Lake County
Recorder's office confirmed the square footage measurements of the
Wests. The appraisal erred in improperly increasing the square
footage by 390 finished and 170 un-finished square feet for a total of
560 square feet error.

B.

One Comparable Property was Beyond Boundaries Identified as
Comparable - The appraisal report relied on the prices of other
homes in the area to determine the value of the subject property "are
from 7200 S. to 9400 S. and from 2000 E. to 2900 E." Comparable
#1 was further West and North of the appraisers own defined
neighborhood boundary.

(R. at 642-643).
West's sought recovery from Appellees based upon contract and negligent
misrepresentation. On February 24, 1999, Appellants filed suit in Third District
Court. A lengthy discovery delay ensued, punctuated by the Court's award of
certain attorney fees to Appellees (R. at 623). Motions for Entry of Judgment by
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Default and Sanctions for Discovery Abuse were not addressed by the Court upon
its entering of Judgment on the Pleadings for Appellees.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When Appellants learned that Appellees had negligently overstated the square
footage of a home they had purchased by 560 square feet (18% of the size of the home),
they sought recovery from Appellees based on the true value of the property using the
correct square footage and correspondingly lower comparable sales of homes in the area.
Appellees were persuasive in convincing the trial court that Appellants are barred from
recovery under the economic loss doctrine. Appellants have distinguished Appellee's line
of authority with the correct precedent, Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2000)
which allows Appellants to recover when there is an independent duty of care owed by
professionals such as real estate agents and appraisers, to persons not necessarily in
privity of contract with them.
Furthermore, Appellant's secured the requisite contractual relationship with
Appellees to sue under breach of contract theories when the appraisal contract between
sellers and Appellees was transferred, with full knowledge of Appellees, to Appellants,
who paid $150.00 for the appraisal. Appellants thus step into the sellers shoes for
purposes of enforcing their rights.

5

ARGUMENT I
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE DOES NOT BAR A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION WHERE THE CLAIM IS BASED ON A RECOGNIZED
DUTY OF CARE INDEPENDENT OF ANY CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE PARTIES
The Trial Court erroneously applied the economic loss doctrine to Appellants here.
In its memorandum decision, the lower Court concluded as a matter of law that
Appellants had no cause of action for economic losses caused by negligent
misrepresentations made by Appellees to Appellants because (1) they were not a party to
any contract with the Appellees, and (2) there was no physical injury or property damage.
(R.at 694). In support of its conclusion the Court cites Fennell v. Green, 77 P.3d 339
(Utah App.2003). Fennell does indeed stand for the aforestated proposition, but in that
case the defendants were homebuilders and developers whereas in this case the Appellees
are appraisers. While Appellees argue that the distinction is purely academic and
irrelevant (R.at 669), upon closer review the distinction is actually dispositive of this case.
In the Fennell analysis, the court sought to distinguish its holding from two other
recently decided Utah Supreme Court cases applying the economic loss doctrine. The
second of those cases, Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002), was specifically
distinguished by the Fennell court because: " . . . the defendants had an independent duty
to plaintiffs as real estate professionals." Id. at 343. Therefore, by its own reasoning, the
Fennell court would have followed the Hermansen precedent if it had found an
independent duty to the plaintiffs by the defendant homebuilders and developers.
6

In stark contrast to, but not inconsistent with, Fennell, the Utah Supreme Court in
Hermansen laid down the economic loss rule when there is an independent duty of care
under tort law. The facts in Hermansen are strikingly similar to the case at hand.
Hermansen, like Appellants, was a purchaser of real estate; while the defendants Tasulis
and Terena, unlike defendant Green in Fennell, were real estate agents who allegedly
neglected to inform Hermansen of material facts relating to the purchase of residential
property. The trial court in Hermansen used the same rationale used by the trial court in
this case to grant the real estate agents' motion for summary judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and in doing so, shed some light
on the economic loss doctrine in cases where there is an independent duty of care. The
Court traced the history of the economic loss doctrine and clearly distinguished between
the construction industry cases (e.g. the defendants in Fennell) and those cases where the
defendant is engaged in providing professional services with independent duties of care
under tort law. The court found two Colorado cases persuasive:
The proper focus in an analysis under the economic loss rule is on
the source of the duties alleged to have been breached. Thus, our
formulation of the economic loss rule is that a party suffering only
economic loss from breach of express or implied contractual duty
may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent
duty of care under tort law.
Grynberg v. Agric. Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1269 (Colo. 2000).
We expressly adopt this interpretation of the economic loss rule.
Therefore, the initial inquiry in cases where the line between contract
and tort blurs is whether a duty exists independent of any contractual
7

obligations between the parties. When an independent duty exists,
the economic loss rule does not bar a tort claim "because the claim is
based on a recognized independent duty of care and thus does not
fall within the scope of the rule."
Town of Alma v. Azco Construction, Inc., 10 P.3d at 1256, 1263 (Colo. 2000). See also,
SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 28 P.3d 669, 682, (Utah 2001); Steiner Corp. v.
Johnson & Higgins of California, 196 F.R.D. 653, 657-58 (D. Utah 2000); Air Products
and Chemicals, Inc. v. Eaton Metal Products Co., 272 F. Supp.2d 482, 501 (E.D. PA
2003)
Thus, if Appellants can establish that appraisers, like real estate agents, are subject
to an independent duty of care, the economic loss doctrine will not bar the tort claim of
negligent misrepresentation.
ARGUMENT II

APPELLEES HAVE AN INDEPENDENT DUTY OF CARE TO APPELLANTS
UNDER TORTLAW
A.

Appellees have an independent duty of care under tort law.
The Hermansen court specifically found that real estate agents have a duty to deal

fairly and honestly, despite the fact that the broker is acting primarily as the seller's agent.
It cited with approval a California case that held that the purposes for imposing a duty to
disclose accurate or complete information "are to protect the buyer from the unethical
broker and seller and to insure that the buyer is provided sufficient accurate information
to make an informed decision whether to purchase." Id. at 24 (citing Easton v.
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Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90 (1984)). Again similarly to the case at bar, the Easton
court held that "a real estate broker is a licensed person or entity who holds himself out to
the public as having particular skills and knowledge in the real estate field. He is under a
duty to disclose facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which
are known to him

" Id.

The Court thus concluded that a real estate agent owes an independent duty of care
to a person with whom he may not be in direct contractual privity. Hermansen at 241.
The Court also spoke of the real estate agents' added responsibility to insure the
accuracy of information and warned that. . .'when or if
the information is given in the capacity of one in the business of
supplying such information, that care and diligence should be
exercised which is compatible with the particular business or
profession involved. Those who deal with such persons do so
because of the advantages which they expect to derive from this
special competence. The law, therefore, may well predicate on such a
relationship, the duty of care to insure the accuracy and validity of
the information.
Citing Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utahl983) (quoting
If. Harper & James, The Law of Torts, §7.6 at 546 (1956)). Furthermore, the court
added:
Specific to the duties of a real estate agent to those persons to whom
the agent owes no fiduciary duty, we stated in Dugan v. Jones that
"[t]hough not occupying a fiduciary relationship with prospective
purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the vendor is expected to be
honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law for his or her
statutory duty to the public." 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). We
apply this reasoning and hold that Terena as the real estate agent
9

owed a duty, independent of any implied or express contracts, to be
"honest, ethical, and competent" in her relationship with the
Hermansens, although she and Tasulis were hired by the vendor. Id.
In Utah, the independent recognized duty for professional appraisers is established
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-27 and the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice. Under Rule 1-1 of these standards, in developing a real property appraisal, an
appraiser must:

1.

Be aware of, understand, and correctly employ those recognized
methods and techniques that are necessary to produce a credible
appraisal;

2.

Not commit a substantial error of omission or commission that
significantly affects an appraisal; (emphasis added)

3.

Not render appraisal services in a careless or negligent manner, such
as a series of errors that, considered individually, may not
significantly affect the results of an appraisal, but which, when
considered in the aggregate, would be misleading.

The duty for appraisers under this standard is at least equal to if not greater than that
imposed upon real estate agents. Appellees even admitted in their answer that they have a
professional duty to act in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice. (R. at 100).

B.

Appellants are part of a class of individuals owed a duty of care by the
Appellees.
The trial court was disturbed by the notion that Appellants in this case were

seeking to impose a duty of care on the defendants which would have included an
10

unlimited duty to the public, which it stated would have required a much broader
interpretation of relevant law than is reasonably permitted. R. at 694. However,
Appellants are not seeking such a broad interpretation. Appellants are within a small
group of individuals who could be expected to rely upon the accuracy of Appellees'
appraisal in making the decision to purchase a home. Others might include a mortgage
company or lending institution.
The authorities cited by Appellants herein are in clear contrast with the trial court's
rationale, which if upheld would protect appraisers against any action for economic losses
absent privity of contract or physical or property damage. The Utah Supreme Court
made it unequivocally clear in Hermansen that the plaintiffs are numbered among those
who are not barred from filing claims for economic losses based on negligent
misrepresentation. In fact, three cases from neighboring jurisdictions support the
proposition that the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation extends beyond those
in contractual privity with an appraiser and discuss the third parties who may be entitled
to recover damages.
The first of these cases, Schaaf v. Highfield, 896 P.2d 665 (Wash. 1995) involved
an action brought by a home purchaser against a veteran administration-hired appraiser
alleging negligent appraisal. That court dealt squarely with the issue of whether a real
estate appraiser owes a duty of care in the preparation of appraisals to third parties who
are not in contractual privity with the appraiser. The Court held that:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
11

employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipients so intends or in
a substantially similar transaction. Id. At 668.
It is clear that in this case Appellants are among the limited group of persons for whose
benefit the information was generated. The Appellants wanted to buy seller's home. The
Appellees knew that when the appraisal was transferred from the sellers to the
Appellants, and when the Appellants paid $150.00 for the appraisal.
The second case, Stotlar v. Hester, 582 P.2d 403 (N.M. 1978), cert, denied, 92
N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978) also involved a claim for negligent appraisal by a real
estate purchaser. Noting that there was no privity of contract between Appellants and the
appraiser, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico cited with approval the following:
3 Restatement of Torts (Second) s 552 (1977) reads:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
12

(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a
substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the
information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons
for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in
which it is intended to protect them.

(I)t is not necessary that the maker should have any particular person
in mind as the intended, or even the probable, recipient of the
information. In other words, it is not required that the person who is
to become the plaintiff be identified or known to the defendant as an
individual when the information is supplied. It is enough that the
maker of the representation intends it to reach and influence either a
particular person or persons, known to him, or a group or class of
persons, distinct from the much larger class who might reasonably be
expected sooner or later to have access to the information and
foreseeably to take some action in reliance upon it. It is enough,
likewise, that the maker of the representation knows that his
recipient intends to transmit the information to a similar person,
persons, or group. It is sufficient, in other words, insofar as the
plaintiffs identity is concerned, that the maker supplies the
information for repetition to a certain group or class of persons and
that the plaintiff proves to be one of them, even though the maker
never had heard of him by name when t information was given. It is
not enough that the maker merely knows of the ever present
possibility of repetition to anyone, and the possibility of action in
reliance upon it, on the part of anyone to whom it may be repeated.
Id. At 406. (underline added)

The final authority is Larsen v. United Federal Savings and Loan of Pes Moines,
300 N.W. 2d 281 (Iowa 1981). This case has particular relevance to the case at hand
13

because the court reviewed the appraiser's duties in relationship to the purpose of the real
estate purchase sales transaction. Of particular note was the court's finding that:
even though the appraisal might be made primarily for the benefit of
the lending institution, the appraiser should also reasonably expect
the home purchaser, who pays for the appraisal and to whom the
results are reported (and who has access to the written report on
request), will rely on the appraisal to reaffirm his or her belief the
home is worth the price he or she offered for it. The purchaser of the
home should be among those entitled to rely on the accuracy of the
report and therefore should be entitled to sue for damages resulting
from a negligent appraisal.
This is especially true when we "take into consideration the end and
aim of the transaction, . . . . it is undisputed that had the appraisal
reflected the real market value of the home the loan would have been
refused and the Larsens could have cancelled or renegotiated their
contract. Thus, taking the "aim" of the transaction into account, both
the lending institution and the buyers should be foreseen as users of
the appraisal report as an important factor in their respective
decisions to lend money and to borrow money to purchase the home.
Id. At 287.
In the case at hand, the record is undisputed that Appellants would not have
entered into the transaction, nor would the mortgage company have loaned the money to
the Appellants if the appraisal had reflected the correct square footage and the real market
value of the home. (R. at 578-579).
ARGUMENT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
The trial court was in possession of a combination of undisputed facts and
allegations which, if true, would justify the conclusion that there was a contractual
14

relationship between Appellants and Appellees. While Appellants readily admit that the
original contract for appraisal services was entered into between the Appellees and the
sellers of the property, Appellants have submitted documentary evidence and testimony
clearly demonstrating that the sellers assigned the appraisal contract to the Appellants
with the express knowledge of the Appellees and the Appellants paid $150.00 for that
appraisal. (R. at 429).
Both the Appellees arguments before the trial court and the trial court's
conclusions do not focus on the privity of the relationship but on the argument that an
assignee has no greater rights than the assignor. Appellants agree with Appellees'
citations with respect to the elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract, which
are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the
contract by the other party, and (4) damages. Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 38
P.2d 984 (Utah App. 2001). Appellants have plead and submitted evidence, both
disputed and undisputed, on all these elements.
However, Appellants strongly disagree with both the Trial Court and Appellees
characterization of Appellants rights as an assignee. They argue that assignors have no
claim for breach of contract because Appellants' Complaint alleges that Appellees'
breach resulted in a $30,000.00 windfall to the assignors. Absent any damage to
assignors there is no claim for damages for breach of contract. (R. at 630). This analysis
works well in third party assignments where the assignee seeks to make the same claims
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and recover the same amount as assignor. But this is a different scenario. The "windfall"
to the assignors is a loss to the assignee because the assignor and assignee are the buyer
and seller in a real estate transaction. A different result is justified in such situations
where the assignee may stand in the shoes of the assignor for purposes of seeking a
remedy, but is not barred from recovery because the damages are different than those
available to the assignor.
CONCLUSION
Appellants ask this Court to reverse the Trial Court Judge and deny the Appellees'
Motion for Summary Judgment. The evidence is overwhelming that Appellants and
Appellees were in such a relationship that the Court could find a contractual breach where
sellers transferred and Appellants purchased the appraisal and that Appellants were
numbered among those who had a legal right to depend upon the accuracy of the
appraisal. Since the record is clear that the square footage of the home was overestimated
by 560 square feet, approximately 18% of its total square footage, it is obvious to the
average citizen, let alone the professional appraiser, that this has an enormous impact on
the value of the home and the Appellants deserve to have a jury hear that evidence.
Nothing in the law cited by Appellees precludes that. On the contrary, Hermansen
demands that Appellants be given the opportunity to show that they have satisfied the
requirements for proving negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract.
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Respectfully Submitted t h i s ^ i day of August, 2005

KEVIN A. HOWARD
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
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